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Humans unintentionally copy other people’s gestures, postures and speech patterns. This 
behaviour has been termed ‘automatic imitation’, and is thought to play a crucial role in the 
development of social relationships by building affiliation and rapport between interaction 
partners. The current paper critically evaluates reaction time measures of automatic imitation 
and demonstrates that it is currently unclear what reaction time indices measure, due to a lack 
of research assessing dimensions of validity and domain-specificity. Based on this assessment 
of the literature, three suggestions are made for future research. First, studies that assess the 
validity of reaction time paradigms as an index of automatic imitation are required. That is, 
the extent that processes involved in reaction time measures of automatic imitation also 
operate in real-world copying behaviours needs firmly establishing. Second, the extent that 
component processes of automatic imitation rely on domain-specific, domain-general or a 
combination of both types of cognitive system needs establishing. Moreover, theories of 
imitation that move beyond neat divisions between domain-specific and domain-general 
systems should be prioritised. Third, a case is made for why methodological rigour requires 
far more emphasis in order to support the development of a cumulative science of automatic 
imitation. In sum, by providing a critical review of the current literature, as well as suggesting 
new directions for research questions, theories and methods, this paper aims to stimulate 
discussion regarding optimal approaches to studying automatic imitation. Moreover, the 
analysis and recommendations presented here generalise to other domains of social cognition, 







During social interactions, we unintentionally copy other people’s actions. For example, we 
may copy an interaction partner’s body posture, gestures and speech patterns without 
intending to do so. Such automatic imitation behaviour has been argued to serve a central 
social function by building affiliation, rapport and liking between individuals (Chartrand & 
Lakin, 2013).  
Given the ubiquitous influence of imitation on our daily lives, it is not surprising that 
researchers in diverse sub-disciplines of psychology and neuroscience have studied imitation 
as a means to better understand human social behaviour. Across these research domains, a 
variety of methods have been adopted to study imitation, which vary in ecological validity 
(Figure 1). In developmental and social psychology, for example, methods typically involve 
observing live interactions and recording overt copying behaviours (Chartrand & Larkin, 
2013; Ray & Heyes, 2011). The advantage of observing live social interactions is the 
relatively straightforward sense in which copying behaviours relate to real-life imitation 
behaviour. By contrast, in cognitive psychology, reaction time measures of automatic 
imitation have been designed based on stimulus-response compatibility (SRC) paradigms 
(Brass et al., 2000; Stürmer et al., 2000). SRC paradigms have the advantage of being 
amenable to study in controlled laboratory environments, but the disadvantage of reduced 
ecological validity to real-life copying behaviour. Drawing links between reaction time 
measures and real-world imitation behaviour is therefore less direct than observational 
approaches and requires further validation.  
The validity of a measure, along with its reliability, are important concerns for any 
scientific method of measurement: Are the tools used to study a particular phenomenon 
consistent across time (are they reliable?) and do they measure what they intend to measure 
(are they valid?)? Here, I address these questions with regard to automatic imitation research 
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with a particular focus on reaction time measurements. In addition, I also review evidence that 
speaks to the specificity or generality of the component processes that make up automatic 
imitation. Like many complex cognitive processes, assessing evidence for domain-specificity 
is important when interpreting SRC measures of automatic imitation. For example, SRC 
measures could be a valid measure of real-world copying tendencies but operate on domain-
general cognitive and neural architectures for prioritising and guiding behaviour. As such, in 
addition to reliability and validity, I outline how it is also important to concurrently consider 
domain-specificity when interpreting component processes of SRC measures of automatic 
imitation.  
The paper is structured in four parts. First, I provide a short review of reaction time 
tasks that are typically employed in cognitive psychology to study imitation (for a detailed 
review, see Heyes, 2011). Second, I review evidence that assesses the reliability and validity 
of these RT measures. I show that we currently know very little about the reliability or 
validity of RT measures of automatic imitation and this presents a major obstacle to 
promoting a progressive research programme (Lakatos, 1970; Meehl, 1990). Third, I consider 
the extent to which component processes of automatic imitation rely on domain-specific and 
domain-general cognitive and neural mechanisms. I show that there is evidence for a strong 
domain-general contribution to some component processes of imitation, which involve the 
control of automatic imitation, which is contrary to a dominant view in the literature. In the 
final part of the paper, I present an outlook for future research using SRC measures of 
imitation. I propose that future work should focus on establishing validity of the measure, as 
well as the relative domain-specificity of component processes. In addition, I propose several 
ways that models of imitation might be revised to more clearly account for interactions 
between component processes, as well as how increased methodological rigour should help to 
advance this research programme in a progressive and cumulative manner.  
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The overarching aims of this paper are to open a discussion regarding optimal 
methods to study automatic imitation using reaction time measures and to highlight several 
useful theoretical and methodological approaches that are currently being overlooked. 
Importantly, the suggestions for future research generalise to other domains of social 
cognition such as gaze perception and perspective taking, which also rely on SRC paradigms. 
Overall, I argue that SRC paradigms have the potential to make a valuable contribution to 
understanding mechanisms associated with our pervasive tendency to copy others, as well as 
other dimensions of social cognition, but that the current use of such paradigms requires 
revision. 
 
2. Reaction time measures of automatic imitation 
2.1 Key features of the task 
SRC paradigms were initially developed by two research groups with an aim to index 
processes associated with automatic imitation (Brass et al., 2000; Stürmer et al., 2000). SRC 
paradigms are quite distinct from other measures of automatic imitation, which are used in 
different psychology sub-disciplines (and typically labelled “mimicry”). For example, in 
social psychology, imitation is typically measured by observing face-to-face interactions 
between a participant and a confederate (Chartrand & Lakin, 2013). During these live 
interactions, the participant is instructed to take part in a task that is independent to imitation 
(e.g., evaluate photographs), and the number of copying behaviours made by the participant 
are recorded (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Figure 1). As such, the measured behaviour is fully 
expressed automatic copying during a live social interaction. In other words, the task appears 
to have high face-validity, even though the reliability of such measures may be quite low 
(Genschow et al., 2017). 
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In contrast, SRC measures of automatic imitation are more removed from live 
imitative behaviour and typically involve computerised testing procedures in a laboratory 
setting and the measurement of reaction times (Brass et al., 2000; Heyes, 2011). As such, 
SRC measures do not measure overt copying behaviours. Instead, it is suggested that the 
impulse to copy is captured by a reaction time signature. In one version of the SRC imitation 
paradigm, which involves a choice reaction time paradigm, participants respond to an 
imperative cue, such as a number, whilst also observing an action. For example, participants 
may be instructed to lift their index finger if a number 1 is presented and lift their middle 
finger if a number 2 is presented (Figure 1). Concurrent with this instruction, participants also 
observe a finger lift that can either be compatible or incompatible with the participant’s finger 
lift1. Reaction times are longer in the incompatible than compatible condition. Therefore, in a 
similar manner to other SRC paradigms, task-irrelevant features influence reaction time 
performance. 
In a different version of the task, which involves a simple reaction time paradigm, 
actions are pre-specified before the trial begins. At the start of every trial, the action to be 
performed when the imperative cue appears is pre-selected (i.e., always lift your index finger 
when you see a finger movement). Again, the observed movement can be compatible or 
incompatible with the performed movement. Under these conditions, compatibility effects 
still occur to reaction times (Brass, Bekkering & Prinz , 2001; Heyes et al., 2005). Evidence 
for compatibility effects in simple reaction time paradigms suggest that the act of representing 
an action can facilitate or interfere with pre-specified movement intentions and that 
interference effects are not solely tied to situations where a choice between two actions has to 
be made on every trial. Together, the results from simple and choice SRC paradigms 
                                                        
1 Variants of this method have used a hand opening and closing instead of finger movements, 
but the logic of the SRC approach is identical (e.g., Press et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2011). 
 7 
demonstrate that a task-irrelevant feature, the appearance of a moving body part, produces 
reaction time facilitation in the compatible condition and interference in the incompatible 
condition.  
Importantly, the difference in reaction time between compatible and incompatible 
conditions or “compatibility effect” cannot be reduced to differences in spatial compatibility, 
such that up-down, left-right movements of a limb could produce the same effects (for a 
review, see Heyes, 2011). Instead, SRC measures of automatic imitation relate to the 
topographical or configural features of the observed body in relation to one’s own bodily 
features and motor intention (Heyes, 2011). Example features of SRC measures of automatic 
imitation include interference from different types of effectors and movements. For instance, 
effector compatibility refers to whether the identity of the observed effector (e.g., finger, arm, 
mouth) is compatible with one’s own effector, whereas movement compatibility refers to 
whether the type of movement observed (e.g., tapping, waving, smiling) is compatible with 
one’s own movement. For both effector and movement compatibility, the observed action is 
represented and in the compatible case it facilitates task performance and in the incompatible 
case it interferes with task performance.  
At least two processes are engaged for both compatible and incompatible conditions: 
action representation and action control (Figure 2). The distinction between representation 
and control follows directly from work in semantic cognition, which distinguishes between 
representation and control in support of understanding meaning (Jefferies, 2013; Lambon 
Ralph et al., 2017). In the domain of semantic cognition, the representational system refers to 
knowledge of concepts, which are a product of higher-order relationships between sensory, 
motor, linguistic and affective sources of input. For example, the meaning of a concept such 
as “dog”, has been argued to be a product of associated sensory, motor, linguistic and 
affective properties, which are distributed across multiple input modalities. By contrast, the 
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control system manipulates the representational system as a function of the relevant context. 
For example, when playing football, a dominant response may be to activate a kicking action 
on seeing a football. But, when taking a throw-in, this dominant response needs to be 
controlled in order to make use of the hands. Indeed, in everyday life, the dominant or pre-
potent association may not be appropriate. Instead, a non-dominant aspect of knowledge or 
motor responses may need to be retrieved in a more controlled way by prioritising some 
features or actions over alternatives. As such, the interaction between representation and 
control systems, as well as their independent contributions, are central features to 
understanding sematic cognition (Lambon Ralph et al., 2017). 
The logic of two principal interacting systems can be applied to the context of 
automatic imitation. First, observed actions are detected and represented. Such action 
representation is likely to involve both perceptual and motor representations, which span 
visual and sensorimotor cortices (Caspers et al., 2010). Further, but more speculatively, the 
process of action representation could also involve a “matching” process, which compares the 
observed movement to one’s own motor state and likely engages the mirror neuron system 
(Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Iacoboni, 2009). Second, a selection or control mechanism is 
required to implement a chosen action according to task instructions (Brass et al., 2009; Cross 
et al., 2013). In the compatible case, the selection process is assisted by virtue of observing 
the same action feature, whereas in the incompatible case the selection process is more 
challenging as the observed action needs to be suppressed and the correct action prioritised, in 
order for the task to be completed correctly. Of course, in simple SRC paradigms, the same 
level of demand is not placed on action selection processes as the action is pre-specified. 
Instead, the previously selected action needs to be executed whilst observing ongoing actions. 
As a consequence of these SRC effects, it has been argued that the compatibility effect is an 
index of the additional cognitive resources required to suppress the incompatible observed 
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action and enforce one’s own intended action (Brass & Heyes, 2005; Brass et al., 2009; 
Heyes, 2011). In other words, the compatibility effect partly indexes control over the 
spontaneous urge to imitate, such that incompatible actions are suppressed and one’s motor 
intentions are prioritised. 
A related, but more cognitively elaborate interpretation, suggests that the congruency 
effect indexes a process of self-other distinction (Brass & Heyes, 2005; Brass et al., 2009). 
That is, in order to perform the task, one has to be able to distinguish between one’s own 
motor intention from the motor intentions of others. It has been suggested that such a self-
other distinction relies on key nodes within the theory of mind network including medial 
prefrontal cortex and right temporoparietal junction (Brass & Heyes, 2005; Brass et al., 2009). 
The theory of mind network has been consistently associated with a range of social cognition 
processes (van Overwalle, 2009). Further, right temporoparietal junction has been implicated 
in distinguishing actions of self and other (Farrer & Frith, 2002; Ruby & Decety, 2001). 
Hence, according to one set of related views, the congruency effect indexes a cognitive 
mechanism that is shared with processing in other contexts that also require a self-other 
distinction. Consequently, a self-other distinction underpinned by right temporoparietal 
junction has been argued to play a broader role in social cognition more generally, including 
autism, empathy and theory of mind (de Guzman et al., 2016; Sowden & Shah, 2014; 
Spengler et al., 2009). 
Representation and control in automatic imitation are likely to rely on a set of 
distributed neural circuits (Figure 2). Furthermore, in the context of automatic imitation, 
evidence to date that identifies the neural substrates supporting action representation appears 
more settled than that underpinning action selection and control. For example, person 
perception processes, which detect others through representation of faces, bodies and 
biological motion, span the ventral visual stream and occipitotemporal cortices (Kanwisher, 
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2010). In addition, action representations evoked by observing others span frontoparietal 
cortices, which include the mirror neuron system, as well as occipitotemporal cortices 
(Caspers et al., 2010; Molenberghs et al., 2012). In contrast, in terms of action selection and 
control, three proposals have been put forward, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
First, the multiple demand network has been argued to play a domain-general role in the 
control of automatic imitation (Cross et al., 2013; Darda, Butler & Ramsey, 2018). The 
multiple demand network spans dorsolateral and dorsomedial frontoparietal cortex and has 
been associated with a range of executive functions, such as inhibition and working memory 
(Duncan, 2010). A second type of account relies on the theory of mind network to provide 
forms of “social control” over imitative tendencies in a domain-specific manner (Brass & 
Heyes, 2005; Brass et al., 2009; Wang & Hamilton, 2012). A third account suggests that the 
mirror neuron system may contribute to action selection and such a selection mechanism may 
be especially relevant in imitative contexts (Hickok & Hauser, 2010; Hickok, 2013). These 
accounts of action representation and control are illustrated in Figure 2 and it is clear that 
further research is required to distinguish between these accounts, especially in terms of 
control. 
Ultimately, and irrespective of the cognitive interpretation placed on the congruency 
effect, the SRC automatic imitation task has been argued to be a lab equivalent of overt 
copying behaviour measures (Heyes, 2011). In overt copying behaviour, automatic imitation 
is fully expressed as a copying action, whereas the SRC measure is argued to index a covert 
signature of the unexpressed tendency to automatically imitate. As such, the possible utility of 
such a task is rather enticing, as it would enable questions of social cognition to be probed 
with the experimental control afforded by laboratory conditions typical of SRC measures. 
With the obvious interdisciplinary appeal of linking SRC tasks to overt copying behaviours, it 
is somewhat surprising that although many papers have been published that cite the original 
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work (i.e., according to Google Scholar in July 2018, Brass et al., 2000 has been cited over 
650 times), there has been very little empirical work that has directly assessed the reliability 
or validity of the task, which is the focus of the next section. 
 
2.2. Reliability and validity  
Reliability and validity are key concerns for any type of scientific research. Although the SRC 
measure of automatic imitation has been used as a tool to study the intersection between 
social and cognitive psychology, as well as cognitive neuroscience, it is surprising that very 
few studies have investigated its reliability or validity. To date, only one study has 
systematically studied reliability and validity in the SRC task (Genschow et al., 2017). 
Genschow and colleagues (2017) demonstrated that the reaction time compatibility effect had 
a large effect size (Cohen’s d = 1.56) and high levels of split-half reliability (Spearman-
Brown coefficient =.86). That is, there was relatively good correspondence between task 
performance during odd and even trials. By contrast, Genschow and colleagues (2017) 
showed that a measure of overt copying behaviour (rather than reaction times) had low 
reliability and overt copying behaviour did not correlate with performance on the SRC 
paradigm. Of course, low reliability in one task makes it hard to interpret a lack of correlation 
between variables (Cronbach, 1990). Hence, to date, no robust evidence currently exists either 
for or against the validity of SRC tasks as a laboratory equivalent of overt copying of other 
people’s behaviour. As such, it seems necessary to establish the validity of the task, in terms 
of its ability to index particular types of imitative process. 
As recently summarised by Gray (2017), at least three types of validity would be 
important to establish with respect to the SRC task: construct, convergent and divergent 
validity. In essence, it is important to establish what SRC paradigms are measuring, as well as 
what these measurements relate to and do not relate to. These fundamental relationships need 
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specifying before researchers can use the SRC paradigm to draw strong inferences regarding 
imitation-related processes and other social or non-social parameters. The importance of each 
type of validity in the context of automatic imitation research is outlined below.  
 
Construct validity 
Construct validity is the degree to which a test measures what it claims to be measuring 
(Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). Although commonly applied to psychometric studies in 
psychology, evidence that reaction time measures of automatic imitation relate to other forms 
of imitative abilities would provide a valuable source of construct validity. If the SRC 
paradigm indexes the control of the urge to imitate, then a relationship should exist between 
other measures that involve the tendency to imitate. Establishing construct validity would 
provide justification that the SRC paradigm can be used in a manner that indexes processes 
relating to imitation. Currently, with only one study addressing this issue directly to my 
knowledge (Genschow et al., 2017), the relationship between reaction time and observational 
measures of automatic imitation is unclear. As such, before concluding that SRC measures 
provide a lab equivalent of live copying behaviour (Heyes, 2011), more research is required to 
validate which processes associated with overt copying behaviour, if any, relate to reaction 
time measures of imitation. To do so, comparing SRC measures with overt copying 
behaviours during live social interactions (e.g., Chartrand & Lakin, 2013), as well as using 
virtual reality (Pan & Hamilton, 2018), would be beneficial. 
Even if reaction time and observational indices of imitation are not measuring the 
same thing, they could be indexing different component processes of a broader phenomena – 
automatic imitation (Genschow et al., 2017). Therefore, it is possible that both measures 
could be interesting to study in their own right, in order to understand mechanisms 
underpinning imitation behaviour, while not sharing any direct relationship to each other. 
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Firm support for relationships between distinct measures of imitation will only be possible, 
however, with dedicated empirical investigation.  
 
Convergent validity  
Convergent validity is the degree to which two measures of constructs that theoretically 
should be related are actually related (e.g., Russell, 1978). If the SRC paradigm indexes 
processes associated with imitation (Brass & Heyes, 2005; Heyes, 2011) and imitation is 
associated with social processes more generally (Chartrand & Lakin, 2013), then reaction 
time measures of imitation should correspond to some degree with related social variables. 
For example, individual differences in social variables such as empathy (Chartrand & Bargh, 
1999), as well as person knowledge (van Baaren et al., 2009), mood (van Baaren et al., 2006; 
Likowski et al., 2011) and pre-existing rapport (McIntosh, 2006; Stel et al., 2010) have been 
shown to influence live interaction measures of imitation (for a review, see Chartrand & 
Lakin, 2013).  
The equivalent data for reaction time measures of automatic imitation are not entirely 
convincing. The largest datasets to date provide no evidence for individual differences in 
reaction time measures as a function of social dimensions of personality, such as empathy, 
agreeableness or narcissism (Butler et al., 2015; Genschow et al., 2017). Indeed, a recent 
meta-analysis shows that the effects of social personality variables on SRC measures of 
automatic imitation overlap with zero, which is suggestive of no effect (Cracco, Bardi et al., 
2018). Therefore, the only studies that show effects of personality on SRC measures either do 
not replicate when tested in larger samples (e.g., Narcissism; Obhi et al., 2014; Hogeveen & 
Obhi, 2013) or have only been demonstrated once in small single-experiment samples (e.g., 
Alexithymia: Sowden et al., 2016).  
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It is possible that SRC tasks are not particularly well-suited to studying individual 
differences (Hedge et al., 2017), and experimental work may be more effective at studying 
how social factors influence automatic imitation. To this end, several recent studies have 
shown that social factors can influence SRC measures of imitation (Heyes, 2011; Wang & 
Hamilton, 2012). SRC measures of imitation are increased in situations that promote 
affiliation through eye contact (Wang et al., 2011), group membership (Gleibs et al., 2016), 
and facial expressions (Butler et al., 2016), as well as when interacting with more human-like, 
rather than robotic, agents (Press, 2011; Kilner et al., 2003; Klapper et al., 2014). Other work 
has shown that when prosocial attitudes are generated (Cook & Bird, 2011; Leighton et al., 
2010), or prosocial gestures are signalled (Cracco, Genschow, et al., 2018), imitation 
increases. These studies suggest that the compatibility effect is modulated by social factors in 
a broadly corresponding manner to findings from overt measures of behavioural copying 
(Chartrand & Lakin, 2013). These results have led to theories that suggest an opportunity for 
social reward can increase imitation (Wang & Hamilton, 2012). 
In sum, there is mixed evidence for convergent validity using the SRC automatic 
imitation task. There is no compelling evidence for convergent validity based on individual 
difference research, but there is some emerging evidence for convergent validity based on 
experimental work, which shows that social factors influence overt copying behaviours as 
well as SRC measures. These initial experimental studies hold promise, but more research is 
needed with larger sample sizes and clear replications to provide confirmatory evidence. 
Moreover, it is currently unclear which component processes (i.e., action representation, 
control or both) are being considered in these studies. Without separating which component 
processes are under investigation, it could mean that some processes exhibit convergent 
validity and others do not. Consequently, future work that tests component processes 
separately for convergent validity would be beneficial. More generally, low reproducibility 
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rates in psychology, which vary between 25 and 50%, are worth consideration in this context 
(Open Science Collaboration, 2015). Given the current lack of robust replications that confirm 
live social interaction measures of imitation and coupled with evidence for low reliability of 
the effects (Genschow et al., 2017), it would be prudent for the field to perform powerful 
replications of live copying effects, whilst also comparing such effects to SRC measures.  
 
Divergent validity 
Divergent or discriminant validity tests whether measures that are supposed to be unrelated to 
each other are indeed unrelated (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). If the SRC paradigm indexes 
imitative control specifically, then such measures should diverge, to some degree, from 
processes associated with non-imitative control and other non-social processes. Initial 
evidence for divergent validity has been provided through functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) and behavioural studies. For example, using fMRI, Brass and colleagues 
(2005) showed a double dissociation in right temporoparietal junction between the SRC 
measure of automatic imitation and a non-social compatibility task (Brass et al., 2005). The 
authors suggested that responses in right temporoparietal junction diverge to some degree 
from a non-social task. However, it is unclear how to interpret such a response, because right 
temporoparietal junction has been associated with orienting to social and non-social stimuli 
(Corbetta et al., 2008). In addition, the SRC measure of imitation, which was used by Brass 
and colleagues (2005), partly reflects spatial compatibility or the tendency to respond faster to 
a stimulus when it is on the same side of space as the response (e.g. Simon 1969). As such, 
the most commonly used automatic imitation task has non-social (spatial) features, as well as 
social (imitative) features. Therefore, differences in right temporoparietal junction could 
reflect different degrees of non-social control, as much as different degrees of social control. 
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Behavioural data have also provided some evidence for divergent validity by 
measuring the imitative component independent from the spatial component. These studies 
show that in the absence of a spatial component, the imitative component remains above zero, 
but is 3-4 times smaller than the spatial component (Bertenthal et al., 2006; Boyer et al., 
2012; Catmur & Heyes, 2011; Darda et al., 2018; Gowen et al., 2016; Marsh et al., 2016). 
Additionally, the spatial and imitative components display different timecourses, which 
further demonstrates that they are dissociable (Catmur & Heyes, 2011). Whilst these 
behavioural findings show that spatial and imitative components of the task are not identical 
and diverge to some degree, the lack of robust evidence for construct and convergent validity 
for the imitative component mean that it is still difficult to interpret as a valid reaction time 
signature of overt automatic copying behaviour. Primarily, there is an absence of robust 
evidence for construct and convergent validity for the imitative component. In addition, 
however, the evidence that does exist is limited to a few studies, which typically do not 
separate imitative and spatial component processes. Therefore, the small amount of evidence 
that is available does not convincingly demonstrate construct or convergent validity for the 
imitative component of SRC measures.  
In sum, the extent to which SRC measures are related to imitation and other social 
abilities and diverge from non-social abilities will be important for future work to more firmly 
establish, in order to understand what SRC measures of automatic imitation are and are not 
indexing. 
 
3. Domain-specificity   
 
A further consideration for interpreting SRC measures of automatic imitation is the extent to 
which SRC measures rely on domain-specific and/or domain-general processes. Domain-
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specific processes are tailored to particular tasks or types of information, whereas domain-
general processes operate across multiple tasks and types of information (Barrett, 2012; 
Fodor, 1983). In this section, I consider current evidence for domain-specificity in SRC 
measures of automatic imitation, as well as the implications for current theories.  
A neat division between domain-specific and domain-general processes is likely to be 
an unrealistic model for many aspects of perception and cognition (Barrett, 2012; Kanwisher, 
2010; Michael & D’Ausilio, 2015; Spunt & Adolphs, 2017). Indeed, consideration of the 
relationship between domain-specific and domain-general systems provides more fertile 
ground for understanding complex mental processes and also respects the inherent complexity 
of mind/brain organisation. Further, most cognitive measures are unlikely to be “pure” 
measures of a process, which necessarily prompts the question of extent. That is, to what 
extent do domain general and specific systems contribute to imitative processes and how are 
they related?  
Addressing questions of extent has not been a primary focus of SRC imitation studies. 
For example, studies that have manipulated imitative compatibility independent of spatial 
compatibility (e.g., Bertenthal et al., 2006; Boyer et al., 2012; Catmur & Heyes, 2011) are 
unlikely to represent a pure measure of imitation control. This is especially important for 
theories of imitation control, which suggest that self-other conflict between interaction 
partners is regulated through engagement of a domain-specific neural network associated with 
social cognition (Brass et al., 2009). Specifically, Brass and colleagues (2009) propose that 
right temporoparietal junction and medial prefrontal cortex, which are key nodes in the 
theory-of-mind network (Frith & Frith, 1999; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; van Overwalle, 
2009), are also involved in regulating imitative interactions between self and other. Moreover, 
a self-other distinction underpinned by right temporoparietal junction has been argued to play 
a broader role in social cognition more generally, including autism, empathy and theory of 
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mind (de Guzman et al., 2016; Sowden & Shah, 2014; Spengler et al., 2009). However, right 
temporoparietal junction is also associated with domain-general processes associated with the 
multiple demand network (Duncan, 2010) and with orienting to social as well as non-social 
cues (Corbetta et al., 2008). Thus, right temporoparietal junction has been associated with 
multiple social and non-social functional processes (Schuwerk et al., 2017).  
In terms of fMRI evidence, results published to date do not provide convincing 
evidence for the engagement of a domain-specific neural network during the control of 
imitation that is specifically tied to social cognition. Some studies have shown engagement of 
brain regions associated with the theory of mind network (e.g., Brass, Zysset & von Cramon, 
2001; Brass et al., 2005), while others showed engagement of the multiple demand network 
(e.g., Bien et al., 2009; Marsh et al., 2016). The multiple demand network has been shown to 
operate in a wide variety of tasks that require processes such as inhibition, working memory 
and attention (Duncan, 2010). Mental operations in the multiple demand network are domain-
general, rather than domain-specific, in the sense that they operate across a variety of 
contexts. Moreover, such domain-general mental operations have been associated with 
regions of dorsolateral and dorsomedial frontoparietal cortices (Duncan, 2010; Fedorenko et 
al., 2013), which are largely distinct from the theory of mind network (Frith & Frith, 1999; 
Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Van Overwalle, 2009). 
A limiting factor in most prior fMRI studies of automatic imitation, however, is that 
they have typically tested small sample sizes and have not functionally defined regions of 
interest, thus reducing functional resolution. Small sample sizes reduce statistical power to 
detect effects and low functional resolution means that engagement of a region, especially one 
with such widespread functional properties as right temporoparietal junction, is difficult to 
interpret in a functional sense. More recent work by Darda and colleagues (2018), however, 
has taken steps to overcome these limitations by scanning larger sample sizes in a multi-
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experiment study (N=28; N=50), and independently localising theory-of-mind and multiple 
demand networks in individual participants. Moreover, whilst keeping the stimulus (a human 
hand) and task (respond to number cues) constant, Darda and colleagues (2018) measured 
imitative compatibility independently from spatial compatibility and showed that imitative 
compatibility effects only recruit the multiple demand network and not the ToM network. 
More specifically, imitative compatibility effects were identified in parts of inferior and 
superior parietal cortex, as well as inferior and middle frontal gyri, which were independently 
localised using a task that engages the multiple demand network (Darda et al., 2018). In 
contrast, in regions of the theory of mind network, even trends in the expected direction were 
not observed. The evidence for domain-specificity for the control of automatic imitation from 
fMRI studies, therefore, remains unconvincing to date. 
These results have implications for neural and cognitive theories of automatic 
imitation. The results are consistent with models of imitation that feature a generalist view of 
control, which relies on the multiple demand network rather than the theory of mind network. 
Indeed, evidence that control in imitation relies on the same system that is engaged in a wide-
range of executive functions such as inhibition and working memory (Darda et al., 2018), 
may suggest that the same selection mechanism operates the social and non-social contexts. 
For instance, the control mechanism could be the same whether selecting between social 
(fingers, arm and mouth movements) or non-social features (arrows, words and objects). By 
contrast, the results are inconsistent with theories that suggest that the control of imitation 
relies on two nodes of the ToM network (medial prefrontal cortex and right temporoparietal 
junction), which support a process of self-other distinction (Brass & Heyes, 2005; Brass et al., 
2009).  
The lack of evidence for domain-specificity also has important implications for 
researchers interpreting findings from the SRC task. Experimentally manipulating social 
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variables or neurostimulation procedures that target “social networks” could be influencing 
domain-general orienting and selection processes, rather than an imitative component 
specifically. In other words, modification to a domain-general system could be the route by 
which social control is exerted in imitation, much like other domains of social cognition and 
perception that show interplay between domain-general and specific systems (Zaki et al., 
2010; Baldauf & Desimone, 2014). Some prior models of imitation have included roles for 
domain-general processes in the control of imitation (Cross et al., 2013; Heyes, 2011; Gowen 
& Poliakoff, 2012; Darda et al., 2018), but much more attention has been placed on models 
that include “social control”, which rests on domain-specific processes (Brass et al., 2009; 
Heyes & Brass, 2005; Wang & Hamilton, 2012). Importantly, there is no reason why the 
cognitive structure proposed here, which places much greater emphasis on interactions 
between domain-general and domain-specific systems, could not also operate during live 
social interactions, such as when social factors influence overt copying behaviour (Chartrand 
& Lakin, 2013). That is, social factors that modulate real-world copying behaviour could also 
operate through a domain-general action selection mechanism. Therefore, before a 
moderating factor can be concluded to be operating on a domain-specific (imitative) process, 
it would be important to clearly identify the component parts of the broader imitative 
mechanism as well as which parts are influenced by social factors. In addition, alternative 
neurocognitive models are required, which do not rely on right temporoparietal junction and 
medial prefrontal cortex as solitary imitation controllers (Brass et al., 2009; Wang & 
Hamilton, 2012), but instead consider interplay between domain-general and domain-specific 
systems. Such future directions for imitation research are the focus of the next section.  
 
4. Looking forward 
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Theory and methods in imitation research need updating if the use of SRC paradigms are 
going to be able to contribute to a progressive research programme (Lakatos, 1970), and thus 
enable a cumulative and reproducible science to emerge (Munafo et al., 2017). In the 
following two subsections, I outline ideas for future research in terms of opportunities for 
theoretical and methodological development. 
 
4.1 Validity and domain-specificity 
The level of validity and domain-specificity of the component processes of SRC measures of 
automatic imitation need to be systematically investigated. Validity and specificity are 
orthogonal dimensions and could both range from low to high (Figure 3). Validity in this 
sense would be a composite of multiple dimensions of validity. Both validity and domain-
specificity should be evaluated by degree: To what extent are component processes, such as 
action representation and control, valid indices of processes associated with copying ‘in the 
wild’? And to what extent does automatic imitation recruit processes that rely on domain-
specific, domain-general or a combination of cognitive architectures? 
 Four broad combinations of validity and specificity emerge. Figure 3 illustrates these 
dimensions as positions A to D. Position A represents high validity and domain-specificity. 
This would suggest that the task indexes a measure that is associated with imitation and relies 
on a cognitive and neural architecture that is relatively domain-specific, such that it 
preferentially operates in social contexts and when interacting with other people. This is 
similar to the position put forward by a number of researchers, at least implicitly (Brass et al., 
2009; de Guzman et al., 2016; Sowden & Shah, 2014; Spengler et al., 2009). Position B 
represents low validity, but high domain-specificity. This would suggest that the process does 
not operate in overt copying behaviour, but it is specific to social interactions rather than a 
more general cognitive mechanism. This would suggest that the process is tied to the task and 
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socialness but is not engaged in overt copying behaviour. Position C represents high validity, 
but low specificity. This would suggest that the process is tied to overt copying behaviour, but 
that it is a domain general mechanism. An example could be a general selection mechanism 
that takes all kinds of different inputs and prioritises them in the context of an individual’s 
current goal. Finally, position D would show low validity and low specificity. This would 
suggest that the process is not tied to imitation particularly, nor is it tied to a specific social 
domain of operation. An example could be a general selection mechanism that operates in the 
task but does not reflect the type of selection that operates in live copying behaviour. Position 
D would be worth confirming to suggest that other tasks may be more appropriately suited to 
study imitation.  
 As outlined in the introduction, automatic imitation is likely be a product of several 
component processes such as action representation and action control (Figure 2). Component 
processes such as action representation and control are not required to have the same profile 
of validity and specificity. For example, action representation could rely to a greater extent on 
domain-specific resources, whereas control could rely to a greater extent on domain-general 
resources. Furthermore, component processes need not operate the same in SRC and real-
world measures of imitation. For example, it is plausible that SRC tasks measure action 
representation processes that are also used in real world copying behaviours, but domain-
general selection processes that are not used in real-world copying. Alternatively, it is also 
plausible that the basic component processes operate in a largely similar manner in SRC and 
real-world contexts, but the interaction between these processes differs. Indeed, the type of 
control over action representations exerted during live social interactions is likely to be much 
richer and more diverse than the socially impoverished SRC context. As a consequence, real-
world imitation could be underpinned by quantitatively stronger interactions between 
component processes (e.g., stronger executive influences on action representations in real-life 
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than SRC tasks) as well as qualitatively different kinds of interaction between component 
processes (e.g., general executive processes could be recruited more in the SRC task, but 
more socially-specific forms of control, which may result from outputs of theory of mind 
systems, may be recruited in real-world settings). Therefore, one key focus of future research 
should be to address where component processes lie in this validity-specificity space, rather 
than where tasks as a whole lie. Investigating how social context and the type of imitation 
(SRC vs. real-world) influences the operation of component processes would be a valuable 
contribution to the literature. In short, consistent with recent suggestions in social cognition 
(Schaafsma et al., 2015), it would be important to deconstruct automatic imitation into 
component pieces, study them and then reconstruct them into a better understanding of the 
overall, complex phenomenon of interest – automatic imitation. By doing so, we may develop 
a better idea of the structure of the processes involved. The next section focusses on testing 
more complex cognitive and brain models. 
 
4.2 Cognitive and brain models need revision and higher complexity 
In scientific research, it is important that theoretical foundations are clearly 
articulated, as these provide the blueprints for research programmes to generate and test 
hypotheses (Gray, 2017; Meehl, 1990; Popper, 1959). To develop more detailed cognitive and 
neurobiological models of imitation, several theoretical avenues are ripe for further 
investigation. For instance, considering the issue of domain-specificity, which was outlined in 
the previous section, it is noteworthy that one set of processes associated with imitation could 
be domain-general (control / selection) without requiring the entire set of processes that 
support imitation to be domain-general (Figure 4). For example, it is possible that we use a 
specialised neural architecture for detecting the presence of conspecifics and their actions 
(Kanwisher, 2010; Caspers et al., 2010), but select between different actions using domain-
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general control systems (Duncan, 2010; Figure 4). This structure closely follows the structure 
put forward in the ‘controlled semantic cognition’ view of semantic cognition (Lambon Ralph 
et al., 2017). This type of analysis supports the proposal that information processing models 
of social cognition need not be exclusively tied to component processes that are domain-
specific (Spunt & Adolphs, 2017). The analysis also highlights the importance of clearly 
defining component processes in a model, as well as the possible information processing 
specificity of each component. Relatedly, it may well be the links between domain-specific 
(person perception and action observation) and domain-general processes (selection) that 
make a process distinctly social rather than non-social. Indeed, positing links between 
domain-specific and general systems has proven useful in other domains of social perception 
and cognition (Zaki et al., 2010; Baldauf & Desimone, 2014; Quadflieg et al., 2010; 
Sreenivasan et al., 2014; Spunt & Adolphs, 2017).  
Prior models of imitation have proposed links between domain-general and domain-
specific systems (Cross et al., 2013; Heyes, 2011; Gowen & Poliakoff, 2012). Other models 
of imitation emphasise social control exerted by domain-specific systems such as the theory 
of mind network, but do not mention domain-general control architectures (Brass et al., 2009; 
Wang & Hamilton, 2012). However, none of these models make reference to representation 
and control, as defined in semantic cognition (Jefferies, 2013; Lambon Ralph et al., 2017). As 
such, I suggest that it is valuable to at least consider these different models of imitation with 
respect to the definitions of representation and control outlined in section 2.1 (Table 1). The 
breakdown of these models in terms of representation and control (as outlined in Table 1) is 
only suggestive at this stage and is likely to underestimate the complexity of mental processes 
involved. However, it is clear that these accounts make substantially different claims about 
the underlying neural bases of automatic imitation. As a consequence, Table 1 represents an 
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attempt to try to compare and contrast these accounts using a common language, in order to 
explore if these accounts generate distinct and testable hypotheses.  
Although several recent models mention links between domain-general and domain-
specific systems (Heyes, 2011; Gowen & Poliakoff, 2012), the model put forward in Figure 4, 
which is adapted from the ‘controlled semantic cognition’ framework (Lambon Ralph et al., 
2017), differs from these models in at least two important aspects. First, recent models have a 
dual-route structure (Heyes, 2011; Gowen & Poliakoff, 2012), which separate a fast and 
efficient route from a slower and more controlled route. Although dual-route structures have 
gained prominence in social cognition recently, such as in the domain of theory of mind 
(Apperly & Butterfill, 2009), the same data can be explained with a single route structure 
(Carruthers, 2016; 2017). Therefore, the model proposed in Figure 4 has a single route 
structure, which always has a degree of representation and control. The amount and type of 
information represented and the degree of control exerted will vary based on context. In some 
contexts, there will be minimal control, whereas in other contexts, there will be greater 
control exerted. But in all cases, as outlined in semantic cognition (Lambon Ralph et al., 
2017), imitative control will involve the same interacting systems of representation and 
control. 
A second distinction of the model proposed in Figure 4 compared to prior models of 
imitative processes is the emphasis on distributed processing. Some prior models of imitation 
do not cover the likely range of mechanisms and brain circuits involved (see Table 1). A 
consequence of having a restricted set of components in a model of brain function, is the 
potential to over-ascribe cognitive function to segregated and localised processes. For 
example, Hauser & Hickok (2010; Hickok, 2013) propose that a key functional property of 
the mirror neuron system is a role in action selection without mentioning complementary 
roles for other social or non-social brain circuits. It is reasonable to propose a role for the 
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mirror neuron system in action selection, as well as other processes, but it seems unlikely that 
it operates alone. Furthermore, models that do not include domain-general control, may be 
biased towards an over-emphasis on domain-specific control (Brass et al., 2009; Wang & 
Hamilton, 2012). Indeed, findings taken to support a domain-specific “social control” view of 
the theory of mind network in imitation (Wang, Ramsey & Hamilton, 2011; Wang & 
Hamilton, 2012), may reflect an updated person representation, rather than a form of control. 
Future research should test between these possibilities by including a domain-general control 
component in future models. In short, something as complex as action selection in imitative 
contexts is likely to require a distributing and interacting set of cognitive and neural processes 
spanning domain-general and domain-specific processes.  
Even in distributed models, such as Gowen & Poliakoff’s (2012) dual route structure, 
which spans several brain circuits, a cognitively elaborate set of processes is still ascribed to 
localised structures. For example, Gowen & Poliakoff’s (2012) proposed role for the mirror 
neuron system is “The visuomotor route consists of parietal and frontal circuits involving the 
translation of visual information into action via SRC mechanisms which produces visuomotor 
priming by facilitating or interfering with the programming of the participant’s response.” 
This may be true, but it also need not be the case. Cognitively elaborate computations, such as 
those ascribed to the mirror neuron system, could remain distributed and taken on by a set of 
interacting brain circuits and systems. For instance, the model of imitative control outlined in 
Figure 4 is always a product of representation and control, but the content and relative 
weights assigned to each component can vary. Of course, future research is required to test 
between these possibilities. More generally, emphasising the integration of information across 
distributed architectures (Bullmore & Sporns, 2009), may have a positive impact on 
continuing debates regarding functional claims over segregated circuits, such as the mirror 
neuron system (Hickok, 2009; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010; 2016).  
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The model proposed in Figure 4 is labelled the ‘controlled social cognition’ account of 
automatic imitation due to its direct adaption from the ‘controlled semantic cognition’ 
framework (Jefferies, 2013; Lambon Ralph et al., 2017). As Table 1 outlines, alternatives to 
this structure exist and offer fertile ground for future studies to distinguish between these 
accounts. However, one advantage of the model put forward here is that its core features are 
supported by a wealth of evidence in the domain of semantic cognition, which spans 
neuropsychology, fMRI and neurostimulation techniques. This evidence shows clear 
distinctions between representation and control, in terms of underlying neural structures (for 
reviews, see Jefferies, 2013; Lambon Ralph et al., 2017). The model presented here, therefore, 
proposes that sociocognitive processes, such as those involved in imitative contexts, rely on 
the same broad semantic system that underpins other complex cognitive processes. 
Furthermore, the structure of that semantic system has two principal and interacting 
components of representation and control, which rely on largely distinct brain circuits. 
An alternative approach to theory development can be provided by considering 
specialised recruitment of domain-general architectures. For instance, a recent fMRI study 
showed that a region within dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, which shows a domain-general 
response, also shows a response that is tuned for making specifically social attributions 
(Spunt & Adolphs, 2015). Spunt and Adolphs (2015) interpret this result as the specialised or 
“expert” use for social purposes of a largely domain-general system. Finally, a greater focus 
on computational modelling approaches to automatic imitation (Cooper et al., 2013), as well 
as theories that posit links between biological and functional levels of description (Cook et 
al., 2014), could enable more precise quantitative predictions to be made thus providing a 
stricter test of underlying hypotheses (Meehl, 1990). Taken together, these theoretical 
considerations, as well as recent empirical findings, suggest that greater complexity is 
required when building theories of social cognition that extend beyond a strict division 
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between general and specific systems (Spunt & Adolphs, 2017). Moreover, online tools are 
available, such as Theory Mapping (Gray, 2017; www.theorymaps.org), which aid in the 
development and comparison of theories by enabling researchers to visualise theories and 
model spaces in a common language and store them online (Supplementary Figure 1). 
The proposed avenues for theory development are not only applicable to imitation 
research, but instead generalise to other domains of social cognition. Indeed, similar debates 
regarding domain-specificity have arisen in gaze perception and perspective taking literatures 
that also rely on SRC paradigms (Frischen et al., 2007; Santiesteban et al., 2014). As a 
consequence, core organising principles from the model outlined for imitation in Figure 4, 
whereby the input is social, but the selection mechanism may be domain-general, could be 
applicable in these contexts also. For instance, in order to perceive eye gaze or take another’s 
perspective, it is essential to recognise the presence of another agent, but nonetheless, conflict 
resolution between gaze cues or perspectives may be resolved through a domain-general 
selection mechanism. Moreover, it would be the link between perceptual and selection 
processes that distinguishes social cognition from non-social cognition. In other words, just as 
has been outlined in memory research (Cabeza & Moscovitch, 2013), specialisation for social 
cognition may be characterised by functional circuits that consist of multiple components, 
without the need for each component to be domain-specific (Spunt & Adolphs, 2017). 
 
4.3 More robust methods – power, replication, meta-analysis, pre-registration and open 
data 
In addition to establishing reliability and validity of SRC imitation paradigms, this field 
would also benefit substantially from integrating practices emerging from the recent 
movement toward open science more generally. I do not provide a detailed account of the 
motivation and means to improve rigour and reproducibility, as these issues have been 
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covered at length by others (Cumming, 2012; Simmons et al., 2011; 2018; Nelson et al., 
2018; Munafo et al., 2017; Zwaan et al., 2017). Instead, I wish to highlight that imitation 
research, like the fields of psychology and neuroscience more generally (Button et al., 2013; 
Open Science Collaboration, 2015), could benefit from revisiting foundational 
methodological approaches. A cycle of studies with low power and a publication bias skewed 
towards positive results has produced a questionable level of evidence for many social claims 
made regarding imitation. Approaches that include pre-registering studies, appropriately 
powered designs, replicating results, using meta-analyses and making datasets open and 
available to others would be of great benefit to imitation research. Some of these approaches 
are already being taken in SRC research on automatic imitation (Butler et al., 2015; 2016; 
Cracco, Bardi et al., 2018; Cracco, Genschow, et al., 2018; Darda et al., 2018; Genschow et 
al., 2017), but more universal adoption of these methodological principles would provide 
considerable benefits to current and future researchers working in this area. These 
methodological steps go hand-in-hand with improved theoretical models and are a necessary 




It currently remains unclear what, precisely, reaction time indices of automatic imitation 
measure, due to a lack of research that directly assesses dimensions of validity and domain-
specificity. It terms of validity, there is insufficient empirical evidence that demonstrates the 
extent to which reaction time measures index processes that are associated with overt copying 
behaviours. The lack of validity means that it is possible that reaction time measures are 
indexing a different aspect of imitation that is not associated with overt copying behaviour or 
something entirely unrelated to imitation. Furthermore, it terms of domain-specificity, much 
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like other complex cognitive and social processes, reaction time measures are likely to reflect 
a combination of component processes. Such component processes could operate on 
mechanisms that are specifically tied to social cognition and imitation, more general 
mechanisms or a combination of both types of mechanism.  
Based on this analysis of the current literature, I suggest that researchers should be 
more cautious when drawing parallels between reaction time measures of automatic imitation 
and overt copying behaviours. In addition, three suggestions are made that aim to develop 
understanding of automatic imitation using SRC paradigms. First, studies that assess the 
validity of SRC paradigms as an index of automatic imitation are required. Second, the extent 
that component processes of automatic imitation rely on domain-specific, domain-general or a 
combination of both types of cognitive system needs establishing with greater precision. 
Moreover, theories of imitation that move beyond neat divisions between domain-specific and 
domain-general systems should be given greater emphasis. Third, a greater focus on 
methodological rigour is required to enable a cumulative science to develop. In sum, the SRC 
index of automatic imitation holds much promise as a tool to study component processes 
associated with automatic imitation and thus answer questions at the intersection of 
psychology and cognitive neuroscience. By providing a critical review of the current state of 
the art, this paper aims to open a discussion regarding optimal methods to study automatic 
imitation using reaction time measures, which will hopefully lead to new research questions, 
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Table 1. Representation (R) and control (C) across different accounts of automatic imitation. 
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view (Figure 4; adapted from 
Lambon Ralph et al., 2017). 
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Iacoboni, 2013 
R R ? C 
Gowen & Poliakoff, 2012 
 
R R & C C C 
Hauser & Hickok, 2010; 
Hickok, 2013. 
R R & C ? ? 
Heyes, 2011 
 
R R & C C C 
Wang & Hamilton, 2012 
 
R R C ? 
 
Table 1. Representation (R) and control (C) across different accounts of automatic imitation. 
The designation of representation and control for each account of automatic imitation is based 
on comparing the cited literature to the definitions of representation and control given in section 
2.1, which follow the terms used in the domain of semantic cognition (Jefferies, 2013; Lambon 
Ralph et al., 2017). Given that the majority of authors cited above do not explicitly frame their 
accounts of imitation in terms of representation and control, the above positions are only 
suggestive and it is likely that each account may be more complex than this table is able to 
summarise. Nonetheless, it is certainly the case that different accounts either: A) make different 
claims about the roles of the above brain networks during automatic imitation; B) place 
considerably more or less emphasis on which brain networks are involved in controlling 
imitation, or; C) do not include certain brain networks in the control of imitation. As such, this 
table represents an attempt to try to compare and contrast these accounts using a common 
language, in order to find out if these accounts generate distinct and testable hypotheses. See 
section 2.1 for definitions of representation and control and a more detailed description of each 
brain network. For completeness and to aid comparison between accounts, I identify cases 
where roles for brain circuits were not specified using a question mark.  




Figure 1. Two approaches to measuring automatic imitation. 
 
Figure 1. Two approaches to measuring automatic imitation are illustrated. In the left panel, 
unintentional copying behaviours are recorded during live social interactions (e.g., Chartrand 
& Bargh, 1999). A confederate may rub her face or shake her foot during a conversation, and 
the number of matching actions performed by the participant are recorded. The number of 
times per minute that a participant shakes her foot is greater when the confederate shakes her 
foot than rubs her face. As such, even though there is no instruction to copy actions, 
participants appear to unintentionally imitate the actions of their interaction partners. In the 
right panel, reaction times are recorded during a stimulus response compatibility paradigm 
(e.g., Brass et al., 2000). In one example paradigm, participants are instructed to lift their 
index finger if a number 1 is presented and lift their middle finger if a number 2 is presented. 
Concurrent with this instruction, participants also observe a finger lift that can either be 
compatible or incompatible with the participant’s finger lift. Reaction times are longer in the 
incompatible than compatible conditions and this difference is thought to index the additional 
cognitive resources required to suppress the urge to imitate the incompatible action and 




























Figure 2. Brain networks associated with automatic imitation. 
 
Figure 2. Brain networks associated with automatic imitation. The terms representation and 
control are used as defined in prior literature (see Section 2.1; Jefferies, 2013; Lambon Ralph 
et al., 2017). The representational system refers to knowledge of concepts, which are a 
product of higher-order relationships between sensory, motor, linguistic and affective sources 
of input. The control system manipulates the representational system as a function of the 
relevant context. In the context of automatic imitation, the representational content spans 
person and action representations including face, body, biological motion and action 
perception, as well as mental state attributions. As such, the neural substrates supporting such 
representations span fusiform and occipitotemporal cortices (Kanwisher, 2010), as well as the 
mirror neuron system (Caspers et al., 2010) and theory of mind network (Van Overwalle, 
Theory-of-mind network





























2009). In terms of control systems in automatic imitation, different accounts have been put 
forward, which differently emphasise roles for the multiple demand network (Cross et al., 
2013; Darda et al., 2018), the mirror neuron system (Hauser & Kickok, 2010; Hickok, 2013) 
and the theory of mind network (Brass et al., 2009; Wang & Hamilton, 2012). Abbreviations: 
mPFC = medial prefrontal cortex; TP = temporal pole; IFG = inferior frontal gyrus; IPL = 
inferior parietal lobule; TPJ = temporoparietal junction; pSTS = posterior superior temporal 
sulcus; FG = fusiform gyrus; OT = occipitotemporal cortex; pre-SMA = pre-supplementary 
motor area; MFG = middle frontal gyrus; precG = precentral gyrus; SPL = superior parietal 
lobule; Ins. = insula; ACC = anterior cingulate cortex. 
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Figure 4. A ‘controlled social cognition’ account of automatic imitation. 
 
 
Figure 4. A ‘controlled social cognition’ account of automatic imitation. The proposed 
account of the cognitive and neural processes underpinning automatic imitation presented 
here is adapted from ‘controlled semantic cognition’ accounts of semantic cognition 
(Jefferies, 2013; Lambon Ralph et al., 2017). As Table 1 outlines, alternatives to this structure 
exist and offer fertile ground for future studies to distinguish between these accounts. 
However, one advantage of the model put forward here is that its core features are supported 
by a wealth of evidence in the domain of semantic cognition, which spans neuropsychology, 
fMRI and neurostimulation techniques. This evidence shows clear distinctions between 
representation and control, in terms of underlying neural structures, as visualised above (for 
reviews, see Jefferies, 2013; Lambon Ralph et al., 2017). The model presented here, therefore, 
proposes that sociocognitive processes, such as those involved in imitative contexts, rely on 
the same broad semantic system that underpins other complex cognitive processes. 
Furthermore, the structure of that semantic system has two principal and interacting 



















Supplementary Figure 1. A Theory Map of Automatic Imitation. 
 
Figure 2. A Theory Map of Automatic Imitation. For more details on the development of 






































OBSERVATION OF DYNAMIC BEHAVIOUR
(GESTURE, VOICE AND OBJECT-DIRECTED
ACTIONS)
1 DETECTING THE PRESENCE OF OTHER HUMANS (E.G., KANWISHER, 2010)
2 DETECTION OF DYNAMIC AND GOAL-DIRECTED BEHAVIOUR (E.G., CASPERS ET AL., 2010)
3 DOMAIN GENERAL CONTROL SYSTEMS ARE ASSOCIATED WITH THE MULTIPLE DEMAND NETWORK AND BY DEFINITION
OPERATE ACROSS MULTIPLE TASKS / DOMAINS (E.G., DUNCAN, 2010)
4 DOMAIN SPECIFIC CONTROL SYSTEMS ARE ASSOCIATED WITH THE THEORY OF MIND NETWORK AND ARE FUNCTIONALLY
TUNED TOWARDS SOCIAL INFORMATION PROCESSING (BRASS ET AL., 2009)




























«CULTURE» «SOCIAL CONTEXT» SETTING (WORKPLACE, HOME),
GROUP DYNAMICS
INDIVIDUALISM,
COLLECTIVISM
